By now we can see that, even as states are moving in the direction of more coherent workforce development systems (albeit slowly and fitfully), their policies and practices vary enormously. We expect that this pattern will continue--and rightfully so, given the differences among states in the economic issues they face, the institutions they have developed, and the structure and culture of local and state governments. If states continue to become more active in shaping their own systems, then the uniformity imposed in federal programs like JTPA and JOBS will give way to greater variety in how state and federal funds are planned, combined, and used. In this situation, it is inappropriate to make fixed recommendations, or to decide that the approach of a particular state is the right one for others to follow. Instead, we outline a series of issues that, based on the experiences of these ten states, should probably be considered by all states as they attempt to reshape their workforce development systems. We then examine federal policy briefly, to make three points about policies that are helpful to state efforts in varying degrees.
Finally, we return to the questions we raised at the beginning of this report. It is impossible to forecast whether workforce development systems will continue in the direction of greater coordination and rationalization, as the education system has over the past two centuries; however, the analogy is a useful one, since it can alert us to both the benefits and some of the pitfalls of system-building.
The local-state structure that most states have developed--that is, establishing a state agency by combining or consolidating a variety of programs, together with local or regional counterparts closer to local labor markets--is both logical and flexible. However, states must explicitly consider the following dilemmas or their efforts will simply add another layer of bureaucracy without affecting programs:
In many ways, federal policies have created the problems that state efforts at coordination seek to redress. The accumulation of categorical problems with numerous and conflicting regulations have contributed to the sense of chaos, duplication, and ineffectiveness that, in turn, have generated both state and federal efforts at reform. The question for the federal government, then, is how it can be most helpful as states begin their own reforms. The experiences in these ten states suggest at least three considerations:
| 1. | Federal efforts that bring various education and training providers together have been generally helpful.Ten years ago, for example, local and state officials generally praised the requirements for information sharing and joint membership on governing boards; and although the 7% funds for coordination between JTPA and vocational education were often poorly spent, they were also central to many local innovations. Currently, the efforts to create one-stop centers have been helpful in bringing many participants to the table. While many efforts so far have not gone beyond information-sharing, many centers have grander plans for the future, and some centers have served as a forum to create more substantial coordination and even consolidation. Similarly, STW programs have been generally praised as mechanisms for getting various education and training providers together, even though in some areas they have not yet changed how high schools work (Hershey, Hudis, Silverberg, & Haimson, 1997). Thus, federal policy should in the future seek out opportunities to provide certain programs and services through joint delivery mechanisms, and current requirements for information-sharing and joint memberships should be continued. |
| 2. | Federal regulations continue to be a thorn in the side of state reforms and local programs. There are, however, a variety of approaches the federal government might take: |
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| 3. | Welfare "reform" and "work first" have been overwhelmingly detrimental to workforce development systems,and, by extension, any subsequent federal legislation that imposed categorical and inflexible approaches to education and training would be similarly detrimental to workforce development systems. For the moment, the obvious recommendation is that federal legislation should undo the most damaging aspects of welfare reform; although we do not anticipate that this will be politically possible, given the ideological positions on welfare and the near impossibility of political consensus on any changes.[51] For the future, however, the Congress and the executive branch could at least take the Hippocratic oath of "do no harm," and avoid new programs and regulations that make state reforms more difficult. |
The latest revision of federal legislation came in August 1998, when the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) was signed into law. This legislation is not the massive consolidation contemplated in 1996, which would have combined federal funding for job training, vocational education, and adult education. The WIA maintains separate titles for job training, adult education, Wagner-Peyser (the ES), and vocational rehabilitation, and funds for vocational education will come in separate legislation. In addition, the legislation maintains separate funding for adults, for dislocated workers, and for youth, preventing states from making their own judgments about priorities. However, in many other ways, the WIA contains the following provisions that should enhance coordination and the development of coherent systems:
On the one hand, the WIA places new emphasis on Individual Training Accounts (ITAs), in which participants choose among providers, and de-emphasizes the provision of training through contracts with specific providers. This means that states like Florida, which has already moved in the direction of choice and other market-like mechanisms, should find it easier to continue their developments. On the other hand, states like Oregon, which have preferred an institutional approach to its workforce development, may find it more difficult to switch to ITAs. More generally, when individualsare the principal decisionmakers, rather than program administrators,they may or may not decide to enroll in programs that are well-coordinated with others. It is difficult to compel providers to coordinate if they can attract enough students without such reforms, and consumer "choice" may be influenced by many factors (like proximity and convenience) other than the quality of programs, the comprehensiveness of services, and the links to other providers.
There are several possible developments for ITAs. If these are implemented like pure vouchers, then--like the youth training vouchers adopted in Great Britain (Grubb & Finkelstein, 1998)--they may result in no expansion of consumer choice and low-quality training. If, instead, they are implemented like the "individual referral" model used in Texas--with full assessment and counseling about training options and implications--then the outcomes could be much different, with consumers much better informed and low-quality programs being eliminated from the system.[52]
The WIA is, therefore, somewhat ambiguous in its influences, and it will no doubt take some time for its effects to become evident. On the whole, however, it appears to facilitate the kind of coordination and cooperation that the most active states have pursued in developing more coherent workforce development systems.
We began this report with an analogy between the education system, developed over the past two centuries, and the considerably shorter trajectory of workforce development programs. The developments in education have resulted in a relatively clear progression among its components--that is, from the lower grades to high school, from high school to college. Where these transitions are uncertain, we see considerable effort to make them smoother--for example, in Tech Prep programs to help high school students move into community colleges, or mechanisms intended to smooth transfers among public colleges (both two- and four-year). The education system also includes relatively well-known institutions with predictable characteristics--like the high school, the community college, the liberal arts college, and the research university--despite variation among localities and states in the specifics and quality of such institutions. This uniformity has its costs, of course--distinctive institutions are hard to find, and innovation is often difficult--but it does contribute to the regularity and transparency of the educational system. Issues of quality remain, and have been among the most resistant problems--particularly in urban areas, and for low-income students. In addition, the articulation of the education system with employment is sometimes imprecise--not typically at the baccalaureate level, where education is usually a prerequisite to employment, but at the sub-baccalaureate level where, unlike better-codified systems like those of Germany,[53] there are many equivalent ways into employment.
If the analogy between the better-developed education system and the fledgling workforce development system is appropriate, then we might anticipate certain developments--and, indeed, we can see that these are underway in the ten relatively active states we observed. One is the continued effort to eliminate redundant, ineffective, or overly specialized programs--to eliminate "waste and duplication." The pressures for consolidation, the imposition of performance measures that can detect low-performing institutions, the beginnings of performance-based funding in Florida, and the incorporation of several programs into comprehensive community colleges in some areas are all part of this trend. In education, this has tended to eliminate secondary schools and specialized colleges; in workforce development, this suggests that holistic programs are likely to replace more specialized categorical programs.
A second characteristic of the education system is the growth of relatively clear ways of moving among levels of the system--replacing, for example, the many different ways of getting into college typical of the 19th century with a well-established, if still controversial, process of application and admissions with standardized tests and grades. This feature of system-building suggests that free-standing programs unconnected to any others--15-week job training, for example, or independent adult schools of short duration--are likely to develop linkages to other programs (or simply to be subsumed in other programs, as when community colleges take over adult education). In workforce development systems, this appears to be happening slowly, but it is emerging in a few areas where one-stop centers have encouraged greater coordination, and where local consolidation and integrated service delivery are starting to take place. Indeed, the process we described in Section VI as moving up the hierarchy of coordination efforts, moves toward creating such linkages. And we can anticipate that, if and when local boards are established and become more inclusive--of education providers as well as training, for example--more of this will take place.
A third obvious parallel between the education system and the emerging workforce development system is the problem with quality. It has been quite difficult for localities and states to define for themselves what high-quality programs are. Performance measures have provided some dimensions of outcomes that programs can aim at, but their effects have been uneven, sometimes even counterproductive. Consistently, the same patterns of differences in quality evident in education also emerge in workforce development: The "Brahmins" get access to high-quality training in firm-based efforts and high subsidies in public universities, while the "untouchables" receive low-quality "work first" programs and low-cost community colleges.
Another parallel involves the roles of institutional versus market-like mechanisms. In the education system, dimensions of choice have always been important in postsecondary programs, where the major funding mechanism--grants and loans--is essentially a voucher system. In K-12 education, choice mechanisms stressing aspects of markets--like charter schools and vouchers--have become increasingly popular, though their effects on equity and quality are highly contested. So, too, in the workforce development system, market-like mechanisms are becoming increasingly popular in a number of states. While Florida is the best example of a market-driven approach, many states have combined institutional and market-like methods (as we illustrated in Figure 1).
Other features of the education system are more difficult to detect in workforce development. One feature of the education system from the mid-19th century was the development of bureaucratic mechanisms; teacher credentialing; rigid hierarchies of control at the school, district, and state levels; and governing mechanisms at district and state levels--all with their own justification, but which are generally viewed as stifling innovation, creativity, and flexibility. There are, of course, many complaints about inflexibility in workforce development programs, but the bureaucratic controls in this system are nowhere near the complexity of the regulations in education. The goals of flexibility and responsiveness to changing labor market conditions have been more important for workforce development than for education, and we presume that difference will persist.
We do not mean to suggest that there is anything inevitable about workforce development going the way of education. As we have stressed throughout this report, states have run into considerable problems trying to implement their visions. Many have taken giant steps backward, particularly with changes of governors and changes of direction; and there is a great deal of skepticism that greater coordination is worth its costs. Instead, we have outlined the analogy between the workforce development system and the education system in order to pose the most fundamental question: What do we as citizens, employees, policymakers, and employers want of our public systems?It is then possible to outline numerous possibilities:
As states move to develop more coherent systems, these questions and the potential answers to them become clearer. The question in the years ahead is whether localities and states--and the federal government, in many ways responsible for the creation of workforce development programs--address these questions forthrightly, or whether they answer them indirectly, through the policies they enact without thought or principle.
[50] The implementation of the School-to-Work Opportunities Act, which is jointly administered by the Departments of Education and Labor, has been a bureaucratic nightmare (see Hershey et al., 1997). If cooperation between two departments on new and relatively simple legislation is difficult, cooperation among several departments on legislation that has been in place for several decades, and that is much more complex, seems unreachable. In addition, the political power that would be necessary to force such cooperation would be unlikely to come from either the Congress or the executive branch since the benefits are intangible and prospective while the costs are evident and present, and would be instantly expressed by multiple interest groups. This is a good example of Lowi's (1969) contention that democracies based on interest group liberalism cannot be planned rationally.
[51] Welfare policy illustrates Lowi's (1969) other contention about democracies based on interest group liberalism--that they cannot achieve equity.
[52] See again Barnow and King (1996) and their review of the literature on vouchers.
[53] In international comparisons, the American educational system is usually viewed as not being particularly transparent, at least compared to German-type dual systems, because of the loose articulation of education with employment.