The DOL and DOE had several objectives in designing a broad-based participatory governance structure. At the most basic level, the governance system will organize and implement the standards development process within a framework that can ultimately become self-supporting--not dependent on government funds. In addition, the structure will guarantee that industry-based skill standards have the support and collaboration of employers as well as all relevant stakeholders. This will be especially important when standards move into the implementation phase and later need to be updated.
In this paper, we have argued that the governance structure reflects the relative roles of workers and others within the relevant organizations. For example, skill standards and certification systems for professionals are developed and run by professionals. Imagine a committee established to determine the skills of doctors or lawyers without significant representation from members of those professions. Asking professionals to merely validate (in focus groups or on expert panels) the standards developed by other groups for their occupation would not be considered adequate (or even possible) in the professional model. Similarly, in nonprofessional occupations that have apprenticeships, union members often serve as worker representatives and participate actively in all aspects of program development. Thus, in both professional and apprenticeship models, the workers whose skills are being considered participate in the actual governance of the standards systems. Their roles (or their representatives roles) are more than advisory.
In contrast, traditional task analysis approaches that are compatible with the skill components model involve systems that are run by educators, managers, or trained analysts. Workers (often acknowledged as "subject matter experts"--SMEs) provide technical input and validation at various stages of the process. As we have pointed out, the crucial distinction concerns who is expected to make sense out of the work. As long as workers are viewed as those who demonstrate a collection of skills that can be applied to a variety of tasks at the discretion of their managers, it is logical that those managers are in the best position to determine the required skills as well as the framework for their development.
None of the pilot projects give workers or worker representatives significant influence in the governance of the projects. Only eight projects had at least one worker on their policy committee and only five of the projects indicated a positive or strong relationship with their industry's union(s). Instead, traditional decisionmakers (not the workers themselves) have kept their established roles. These projects do not challenge the traditional distinction between those who do the work and those who have authority to design the work and to determine the skills required to perform it.
Moreover, advocates and planners of skill standards stress that employers, not employees, must "own" their certification systems. For example, a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report argued that the most important element of voluntary skills certification systems is industry ownership and control. They conclude that a proprietary connection is necessary for industry to contribute significant financial investments to certification development as well as to contribute the time and commitment it requires to implement and maintain. Industry's governing role, they contend, will ensure their future interests which are vital to maintaining up-to-date systems (GAO, 1993b). While it is easy to understand the need for this type of industry buy-in, it does set up a potential conflict with efforts to integrate workers (and to a certain extent educators) into the governance process.
Research confirms that those who do the work do not have a substantial role in the development or governance of skill standards systems. Indeed, the GAO (1993b), in their review of certification systems, found that workers, actually had "little input into their (skills) development . . . although collaboration with workers is said to be key to many of the systems operating in competitor nations" (p. 5). And Wills found that many of the most competitive sectors in the U.S. economy have done little or no work to involve either "employers [or] incumbent employees in the development of nationwide skill standards" (Wills, 1993a, p. 1-3). We now turn to a discussion of the governance structures in the twenty-two pilot projects.
The governance of all the projects was similar. Project directors and their staffs were instrumental in developing an initial governance structure. They initially determined the titles and membership for the various committees and had considerable input into the committees' assigned activities and responsibilities. When they were present, existing board of directors of the industry associations often shared the responsibility with project directors/staff for initial committee appointments.
Committees were formed to fulfill two primary functions within the projects: (1) policy direction and leadership and (2) technical expertise and input. Policy Advisory Committees (also called Executive Committees, Steering Committees, or Grant Management Committees) were responsible for input into and the development of overall project direction and were comprised of coalition members from the various stakeholder groups. Technical Committees were comprised of individuals from industry (and sometimes education) with industry-related knowledge and expertise. These individuals were drawn upon to supply detailed comments and/or inventories of tasks, duties, skills, and requirements for job performance.
The following sections will discuss in more detail the responsibilities and makeup of these two most prevalent types of committees as well as the role of trade/membership associations and individual employers and the implications for their past, current, and future participation.
Within the policy-setting framework, however, these committees actually assume a variety of roles, working with and sometimes for project directors and staff members. Nearly two-thirds of the project advisory committees were truly advisory in nature, setting policy direction, guiding, validating and evaluating project design, overseeing the projects, and reviewing and approving progress. Five of the projects appeared to have policy committees that became superficial, ceremonial bodies assigned to "oversee" the project, in effect, working within a governance system that begins and ends with the director and his or her central staff. Three of the projects had policy committees that were hands-on governing bodies where the participants and policy setters worked to establish industry definitions and occupational boundaries as well as actually participating in many aspects of the job analysis process.
Although their roles differed somewhat among projects, the actual composition of the PACs was quite similar for most of the projects. Except for the eight projects that included at least one worker on their policy committees, project steering committee members were individuals who held management and/or administrative-type positions within their respective institutions or organizations--labor, industry, and education. For example, when asked what type of educators were represented on Steering Committees, most project directors indicated administrators and not teachers. Overall, front-line workers and low-level supervisors were absent from policy or steering committees. Instead, workers and supervisors were placed on "technical committees" (if placed on committees at all) where their main duty was providing input in the job analysis phase of the projects.
Although educators were present on eighteen PACs, they rarely played an active role (three of the project directors stressed strong education participation; five of the projects indicated no or insignificant education participation). In most cases, there was a strong emphasis on industry leadership and this was reflected in the prominent role of the industry and employer associations--the "suits" as many project managers referred to them. Certainly there was additional communication between educators and employers as a result of the pilot projects, but it could not be said that the process resulted in a significant development of interactive partnerships between the two sets of institutions, at least not during the development of the standards. Project managers are expecting to increase the involvement of educators when curriculum, training materials, and assessment tools are being developed.
Input from workers and/or supervisors was solicited at two phases in the job analysis process--(1) initial duty/task list development and (2) validation. After preliminary decisions were made regarding project scope and policy perspectives (by PACs, Steering Committees and/or project management and staff), workers and/or supervisors were interviewed either by mail surveys/questionnaires or in focus group sessions to determine relevant job tasks, duties, and skills and their frequency and importance in the workplace (see job analysis section for further detail on the exact methods for gaining worker/supervisor feedback). Later, they were asked to validate the list of content standards and/or tasks/duties that had been synthesized by project directors, staff, and/or policy/steering committees. At few, if any other, times was worker input or feedback required or requested. Indeed, front-line workers and supervisors got involved in the projects only AFTER policy directions had been established.
Worker and supervisor absence on policy-oriented committees had two broad effects. First it reinforces narrowly-defined entry-level worker roles and attitudes--the hallmark of the type of traditional organization that advocates hope will be reformed with the help of skill standards. Ironically, project directors who had given more latitude to workers and supervisors in focus groups stated that, in hindsight, they needed to have exerted more control and structure because this method took too much time and was too costly. Thus, the structure of the projects tended to replicate the top-down environment of the traditional workplace. Not only were workers and supervisors isolated from the industry leaders who participated in many of the PACs, but they were given few opportunities to see the industry as a whole which would have enabled them to better understand their place in the overall organizational framework and skill standards movement.
Second, a governance structure which formally separates management from workers/supervisors (as mirrored in the workplace) perpetuates workers' anxiety and hesitation in freely voicing their ideas about skills and skill standards. For example, few of the projects actually had workers on the PAC, but when a worker was present, project managers reported that they rarely participated in the discussion. This further weakened the value of their influence on the process and the value of their input.
Ironically, although employer associations played central roles in most of the projects and many reported employer enthusiasm, nearly half of the project directors stated that they had difficulty in getting cooperation from individual employers. Employers were particularly hesitant to allow front-line workers the time off from their jobs in order to participate in the focus group sessions--from one to three days depending on the job analysis process used. This was especially true for small employers.
On the other hand, there are two weaknesses in the governance structures of most of the projects. First, they fail to provide a strong role for workers, who were used primarily as subject-matter experts or advisors. Second, little progress was made in developing interactive partnerships between schools and employers. One needs to consider the promotion of standards within the schools as equally important to the promotion of standards among employers.